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Summary 
 
In Hungary, like in many other countries, tax incentives were introduced on 
voluntary pension saving to increase the level of household saving. However, it 
is uncertain whether these incentives really increase saving as skeptics argue 
that households only shift their savings from other types of assets to the tax 
deferred form. Thus voluntary pension saving may crowd out other types of 
saving and may not represent new saving. A tax incentive is effective only if the 
voluntary pension savings are at least partly new ones. In my work, I try to 
identify elements of the tax incentives which might theoretically affect 
effectiveness of saving incentives.  
Empirical research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of particular 
tax incentives. No such research has been done in Hungary. An overview of 
earlier literature from other countries shows that estimation of effectiveness 
encounters serious endogeneity problems. Different suggestions were made by 
economists to overcome this problem but all of them relies on questionable 
assumptions, and thus the scope of conclusions are limited. I estimated the 
crowding out effect in Hungary using different methodologies: differences in 
differences estimation and cohort analysis. Although vaguely, the results 
suggest that tax deferred pension savings do not crowd out other types of 
saving in Hungary.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Household saving is an important policy objective in every country. There are 
two main reasons for this. The macroeconomic argument is that the production 
sector is financing its investments partly from household savings, consequently 
saving incentives indirectly promote investment and stimulate growth. 
Subsequent evidence shows that the correlation between saving and investment 
is strong in open economies as well, despite the large volume of international 
capital flows, see for example Feldstein and Horioka (1980). 
The microeconomic concern is that individuals often retire with low 
wealth and even if they get social security pension benefits they suffer a huge 
fall in income at the time of retirement. The suboptimal old-age saving of 
individuals can arise from different sources, such as time inconsistency (e.g. 
hyperbolic discounting), lack of self control, free-riding (present in most social 
dilemmas), or underdeveloped financial markets. 
In most countries there exist policy efforts to encourage savings. They can 
take many forms, for instance subsidies (tax incentives) or mandated savings. 
Assets accumulated for particular purposes can be targeted by these policies. 
The most popular ones are pension, health, education, housing, and life 
insurances. 
However, governments also face costs when introducing tax allowances 
on saving. Since individuals from the lower part of income distribution do not 
have the resources to take advantage of the incentives (Jappelli and Pistaferri 
2002), such a tax allowance will be mainly used by high income households. 
This results in the opposite to what is aimed by the progressive tax schedule. In 
addition, part of the subsidy will inevitably flow to financial institutions such as 
pension funds, and is also likely to make additional room for abuse. Direct costs 
occur, too, as the incentive will decrease the revenue side of the budget. 
Although household saving is a hot topic in the everyday media and 
policy in Hungary, there has been little academic research carried out to assess 
the effectiveness of different possible policies targeting higher saving rate.  
Since social security has basically full coverage in Hungary, the vast 
majority of families receive pension benefits after retirement. However, there is 
a drop in income at retirement unless the family has additional savings. In 
addition, since the Hungarian pension system has only a small funded pillar, 
most of its volume is not part of investment financing, and thus does not 
stimulate growth. 
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Figure 1:  Aggregate saving in Hungary between 1990 and 2003 (CPI adjusted real 
savings expressed in 1990 forint) 
 
billion forints              billion forints 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of aggregate assets of the Hungarian 
household sector1. Aggregate household saving increased through the 90’s. 
When it first slowed down in the middle of the 90’s, tax incentives were 
introduced in the form of voluntary supplementary pension funds. Then 
households’ finance caught up again, although it is unlikely that pension funds 
played an important role in that, since the assets in pension funds were only 
about 1% of total assets. This share is steadily growing but is still only a few 
percent. In this sense the program is less successful than its counterparts were in 
the US. One reason for this could be the widespread tax evasion in Hungary. A 
large part of the highest income families, who would save the most, pay 
personal income taxes only after a smaller part of their income. Another reason 
why many people do not take advantage from the tax incentives which 
constitute the third pillar of the pension system in Hungary is that they trust in 
the large compulsory first and second pillar of the public pension system. 
Although the replacement rate calculated for mandatory pensions is not low in 
international comparison there is still a significant drop in individual income at 
retirement2 . 
While net financial assets of the household sector have decreased since 
2002, the tax deferred pension fund assets still increase. However, increasing 
pension fund savings do not necessarily increase total savings of households. It 
is possible that the households contributing to pension funds would have saved 
the same amount anyway, and they only redistribute other types of savings to 
the more advantageous, tax favored funds. In this case we say that tax deferred 
savings crowd out other savings. The purpose of my research is to find out 
whether there is a crowding out effect for the incited pension savings in 
Hungary. If there were a crowding out effect then not-incited assets would have 
decreased less in the absence of tax-deferred pension assets. If, however, tax 
                                                 
1Source: National Bank of Hungary 
2Depending on earnings the replacement rate in Hungary is between 70 and 80 percent (source: 
András Simonovits [2003]), but it can be lower because of unofficial earnings.  
- voluntary pension 
saving 
- other savings  
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deferred savings turned out to represent new savings, then without the tax 
incentives total assets would have decreased even more than they did according 
to Figure 1. 
This question is important because, as I stated earlier, subsidy has a cost 
in terms of lost tax revenues. OECD estimates the revenue losses per unit 
contribution on tax-deferred accounts in OECD countries to be between 0.09 and 
0.41 in most countries (Yoo and Serres, 2004). Hungary is in the middle of this 
picture with 0.28. If the saving in voluntary pension funds does not represent 
new saving at least in 28% then the program actually decreases national saving. 
National saving will only increase if households respond to the tax incentive by 
either decreasing their consumption or increasing their labor supply (e.g.  Engen 
et al. 1996). 
Answering this question has relevance for the assessment of recent policy 
considerations, like introducing another type of tax incentive either instead of 
the present pension funds or as an option parallel to them. The new incentive on 
the horizon would probably be more similar to the Individual Retirement 
Accounts in the United States (see Section 3.2). Savings on capital accounts 
would be subsidized, and withdrawal before retirement penalized. Unlike 
pension funds, where the yield is extremely low (sometimes even negative in 
real terms), savers could choose their own portfolio (Ács and Lovas 2005). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review economic 
theories and their prediction about household saving and the effect of saving 
incentives. In Section 3, I summarize the empirical research about the 
effectiveness of tax incited voluntary pension saving. In section 4, I describe the 
peculiarities of the tax incentives in the Hungarian tax system. In Section 5, I 
present my findings. Finally, Section 6 provides some brief conclusions. 
 
2. Saving and incentives in economic theory 
 
To assess the effect of saving incentives, it is important to understand the way 
households make their saving decisions and what possibilities the government 
has to influence the outcome. In this section I will first summarize economic 
theories about saving of individuals, then analyze the most widespread policies 
in light of them. 
 
2.1. Saving decisions 
 
Why do individuals save? There are several competing theories on saving 
behavior. One branch of them is a form or an extension of the so called life-cycle 
hypothesis, while others reject the life-cycle hypothesis and call behavioral theories 
to explain individual saving decisions. 
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2.1.1. Life-cycle model 
 
According to the life-cycle hypothesis individuals smooth their consumption to 
maximize expected lifetime utility. To maintain a smooth consumption path 
independent of the distribution of life-time earning along the life-cycle, 
individuals have to adjust by saving or borrowing. Typically, a person’s earning 
increases gradually from the time when entering the job market until retirement 
when it suddenly drops. Life-cycle theory suggests that rational individuals 
have savings at the time of retirement to offset the sharp drop in income and 
keep on the smooth consumption path. 
The presence of liquidity constraints, when individuals have limited 
ability to borrow, can alter savings compared to what is predicted by the simple 
life-cycle model. Liquidity constraints affect savings through two channels. 
First, when they are present, households will hold some extra savings to insure 
themselves against unexpected drops in income. This type of saving is called 
precautionary saving in the economic literature3. Second, the life-cycle model 
predicts, with certain parameters, that people borrow instead of saving at the 
beginning of the life-cycle. However, savings cannot be negative (or at least not 
without bounds) if people are liquidity constrained. Thus liquidity constraints 
not only affect saving by generating precautionary saving but also by lowering 
the dissaving at the beginning of the life cycle. Honohan (2000) examines the 
extent to which these channels work. He concludes that precautionary saving is 
generally low, but the borrowing of the young is much higher without liquidity 
constraints. He argues that liberalizing financial markets by easing liquidity 
constraints are partly responsible for the low saving rate in developing 
countries. The extent to which liquidity constraints are present is thus an 
important parameter characterizing saving behavior. 
A competing explanation for household saving is the so called bequest 
motive, which partly attributes savings to peoples’ desire to help their children 
either by leaving bequest or supporting them at the time when they leave the 
household. The bequest motive can be incorporated in the life-cycle model 
either by assuming that individuals gain utility directly from the amount of 
bequest they leave at the end of their life-cycle or by attaching some weight to 
the utility of descendants and maximize it together with their own utility. 
More complex models also include labor supply, thus saving can increase 
in a period even when consumption is not decreased, but labor supply is 
increased instead. Such models differs from the others only in that they treat one 
particular good, free-time, separately. 
According to any model which assumes that individuals are rational, 
saving can be described as some function of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, time preference, lifetime income, the distribution of income 
through time, and the effective interest rate on savings. Intertemporal elasticity 
                                                 
3Precautionary saving can also be derived without assuming liquidity constraints, from risk 
aversion and uncertainty about future earnings. 
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is a crucial parameter showing how individuals redistribute consumption in 
time as a response to an interest rate change. Since the prediction of all theories 
based on the life-cycle hypothesis depend on its value, much effort was made to 
determine it, which I will summarize in Section 3.1.  
Another important parameter of saving according to life-cycle based 
theories is the distribution of income through time. It is often measured by the 
duration of earnings defined as 
 
where wt is period t wage and r is the effective interest rate. Policies that aim to 
increase saving have two alternative, either to affect directly the saving by 
mandating it, or to change the effective interest rate by taxing or subsidizing 
saving. In case of the latter, in practice, positive elasticity is assumed, thus 
saving is subsidized. However, the sign of elasticity is theoretically ambiguous 
and, as we will see later, empirical papers often point out that it is close to zero. 
If the elasticity were zero, altering the interest rate would have no effect on 
saving at all. 
 
Figure 2:  Two period intertemporal choice 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the simplest two-period case, when the person is earning 
income Y in the first period and no income in the second. An increase in the 
interest rate rotates the budget line around Y. Its effect on consumption can be 
separated to substitution effect and income effect. The first arises from the change 
in the relative price of first and second period consumption, which appears as a 
change of the slope of budget line, and tends to increase second period 
consumption and decrease first period consumption. If consumption is a normal 
good, which can be assumed, then the income effect tends to increase 
consumption in both periods by shifting the budget line outwards. As a result, 
second period consumption will definitely increase but the effect on the first 
period consumption and thus on saving is ambiguous. On Figure 2 CA is the 
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outcome corresponding to a case when the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect resulting in higher saving. But CB is a possible outcome, as well, 
when the income effect dominates the substitution effect leading to lower saving 
in the first period.  
It is worth noting that although an increase in the second period 
consumption means that saving is higher after the income from interest, but we 
have to consider Y-c1, the amount of saving before interest, if we seek to 
determine national saving. When consumption in both periods increases in 
response to a tax subsidy on savings, the aggregate national saving would 
increase more by government saving than by subsidizing household saving. 
In the general life-cycle model, there are more than only two periods and 
income may be positive in every period. Then individuals maximize  
 
with the budget constraint 
 
Instead of solving the model analytically I restrict myself to summarizing 
its main conclusions. Higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution causes a 
higher elasticity of saving, because in this case an increase in interest rate leads 
to a larger increase in the ratio of time t+1 to time t consumption. The interest 
rate is the most important tool for the government to influence saving, and the 
interest elasticity of saving is crucial for the outcome of any policy using it. 
Another result of the life-cycle model is that higher duration leads to 
higher elasticity, other things being unchanged. Particularly, when the 
household earns income in the first period only then unit intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution implies that the interest rate has no effect on saving, for 
smaller intertemporal elasticities the elasticity of saving is negative, and for 
bigger it is positive. If however the individual has earning in later periods as 
well, then the elasticity of saving is positive even when the elasticity of 
substitution is one. On the margin, if duration is sufficiently high, saving 
elasticity is positive even with inelastic intertemporal substitution, for example 
with Leontief preferences (Bernheim 2002). 
If higher duration increases the interest elasticity of savings then the 
elasticity is higher in a country with a pay-as-you-go social security system, than 
in one without it. Since the pay-as-you-go pension system is unfunded, pension 
benefits do not depend on interest rate, which is a crucial assumption, otherwise 
present discounted value of earnings does not fall in response to an increase in 
the interest rate. Even a funded compulsory system can increase the elasticity of 
additional saving to the effective interest rate of additional savings in the case 
when the interest on compulsory saving is fixed and the elasticity is calculated 
with respect to the change in the interest on voluntary saving. This condition 
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usually holds when we examine the effects of one policy, because one type of 
tax incentive addresses usually one type of saving only, but in most countries 
different tools are used at the same time and we have to be aware of the possible 
interaction between them. 
 
2.1.2. Behavioral theories 
 
Another branch of literature (for a literature review see Bernheim, 2002) points 
out that perhaps other forces than intertemporal optimization drive the 
individual decisions. Behavioral theorists say that most people do not solve the 
utility maximization problem described by the life-cycle theory. They argue that 
it is hard to believe that people can solve such a complex optimization problem, 
and since life cycle saving decision is not a repeated task they do not even have 
the possibility to learn the optimum from experience (Thaler, 1994). 
Low household saving is often explained by time-inconsistency. This 
theory suggests that people save below the optimal level because in the present 
they undervalue their future utility. If this were the case mandating saving by 
governments could restore efficiency (assuming that government knows what 
would be the optimal level, which is questionable). A closely related explanation 
is that people lack willpower, saying that people know that they should save 
more but do not act accordingly. If this were true then restrictions, such as 
penalties on money withdrawal or mandatory contribution, would help people 
to overcome their own myopic behavior. Perhaps these features of voluntary 
saving plans are more important than the tax allowance. 
Another behavioral explanation is based on the possibility that people 
have difficulties in making saving and investment decisions because of the 
complexity of the problem. Their behavior is assumed to be governed by 
incomplete information. The introduction of saving incentives may simply 
increase the awareness of people about the importance of saving, and can 
increase saving through this mechanism. An important observation by Madrian 
and Shea (2001) is that by making complex decisions, people might have a 
tendency towards what is called “anchoring around the default”. This means 
that when a default option is available, people are likely to choose that. The 
default option can be offered by the pension fund or by the employer or it can 
simply be what most people do. For example, if it is advantageous for an 
employer to pay part of the compensation in pension fund payments and do so, 
then employees happily accept it even if they would not save otherwise. 
Another connecting phenomena, the "peer effect", is examined by Duflo and 
Saez (2000). They find evidence that peers’ saving decision influences 
individuals’ own decisions. 
Bernheim (2002) highlights the importance of third-party activities. 
According to him, promotion activity of investment institutions strongly alters 
individual behavior. It might be reasonable then to incite these institutions 
instead of, or in addition to, the individuals who make the decision. 
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People may be more willing to pay to a saving account than to tax 
authorities. This motivates the observed behavior that many people turning out 
to have tax dues at the end of the tax year contribute a larger amount to saving 
accounts instead of paying the taxes to the authority. 
Thaler (1994) introduces the term “mental accounts” to refer to the fact 
that people have different propensities to save on one part of their wealth and 
lower on another, depending on where the wealth comes from, and in what 
form it is. Based on this he suggests making an option for tax payers to receive 
their tax refund on their saving account.  
Framing effect is an expression used for the fact that individuals’ decision 
is affected by the framing of the question. For example it might matter whether 
people think of the intertemporal choice question as how much to consume in a 
particular time period, or as how much to save. Saving policies might change 
how individuals phrase the questions for themselves. And also, the same policy 
can be more effective with the proper framing 
Whatever forces motivate household saving, government intervention to 
increase saving is justified on at least two grounds. First, the externalities arising 
from the social benefit of higher aggregate national saving results in below 
optimal individual saving. Second, some individuals might fail to optimize their 
own consumption path because of time inconsistency, lack of self control or the 
complexity of saving decisions. This second failure leads to suboptimal savings 
as well. In the next section I will overview policy tools for increasing household 
saving. 
 
2.2. Saving incentives 
 
To incite household saving through the tax system, one possibility would be a 
shift from income to consumption tax. The main drawback of this approach is 
the immediate redistribution from the old to the young, and from those who 
have savings to those who have debt. For example, those who have savings 
have already payed higher income tax on their savings and will pay higher 
consumption tax when they consume it. This alternative is not used in practice, 
perhaps for this reason. 
Mandatory saving can both increase national saving and overcome the 
myopic undersaving problem of families. The effectiveness of mandatory 
savings, similarly to voluntary savings, crucially depends on the extent of 
crowding out effect. If mandatory savings crowd out other types of savings then 
it is ineffective in the sense that they do not increase overall savings. According 
to Pistaferri (2002) mandatory pension saving does not fully crowd out personal 
saving. First, pension wealth is illiquid and people are liquidity constrained. 
Second, pension wealth is more uncertain than private wealth, and uncertainty 
leads to lower consumption in general. Third, people might retire earlier if the 
pension wealth is higher, and need more private saving because of the longer 
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retirement period. Although two of these arguments, the first and the third, are 
valid to subsidized voluntary saving as well, there is much more debate about 
the effectiveness of subsidies then of mandating. 
Subsidizing voluntary saving is the most widespread tool in developed 
countries. Subsidy is usually implemented in the form of tax allowance, which 
can be either on the principal or on the interest (or possibly on both of them). 
Careful implementation is necessary to avoid abuse by short term investing in 
subsidized assets and financing investment from borrowing on a lower interest 
rate. The threat of abuse is smaller if agents are liquidity constrained. Usually 
low income families face more liquidity constraints, which points to a potential 
weakness of this policy, because the bulk of saving is coming from high income 
families. To overcome the above problems, such programs subsidize only long 
term pension saving, brought into effect by penalties on early withdrawal.  
In practice, the subsidy on payments to incited saving accounts is 
subtracted from personal income tax. It can be subtracted at the time of 
contribution, when the money is saved, or at the time of withdrawal, when 
benefits are received. According to the timing of the subsidy, saving plans are 
called front-loaded (subsidy received at the beginning of saving period) or back-
loaded (subsidy received at the end of saving period). As noted by Engen et al. 
(1994) a front-loaded plan, with the same tax credit, is usually more 
advantageous for the taxpayer because working age tax rates are typically 
higher than retirement age rates. In addition, knowing that some individuals 
might have time inconsistent preferences, front-loaded plans can be more 
effective, since in case of a front-loaded plan the household gets the subsidy 
when it makes the decision on saving, and not several years later as in case of a 
back-loaded plan. 
Tax incentives usually subsidize long term saving. In exchange for the 
subsidy these assets are less liquid than other types of savings. In practice, a 
penalty has to be payed if money is withdrawn before retirement, or before 
some years of accumulation in case of pension saving, or if the accumulated 
assets are not used for housing in case of home ownership saving plans. 
The whole population is not necessarily eligible for tax-deferred saving. 
When the main reason to start such a program is that some individuals save 
below their needs because they lack self control, then it might be reasonable to 
somehow include only this group into the program. It was the case in the US 
when Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) could only be opened by those 
who did not have other pension coverage. Another reasonable restriction may 
be to exclude high income household above a certain threshold, in order to 
avoid redistribution towards the richest families. In addition, as explained in the 
previous section, the contribution of families who can borrow without limits 
does not increase total saving because they can finance payments to the plan 
from debt. As high income families can borrow more easily their exclusion 
might increase the effectiveness of the program. High income individuals are 
not eligible for IRA in the US since 1986. Eligibility could be also tied to age to 
avoid that people close to retirement age, who can access the tax-deferred 
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savings without penalty soon, fund contributions from liquid types of savings 
or from short term debt. Eventually, in Hungary, just the opposite is in force: 
older people can contribute more to tax deferred saving funds. 
Another important parameter of saving plans, which has to be chosen 
with discretion, is the upper limit of subsidy. If the upper limit is too high then 
the revenue loss for the government will be high, and in addition it induces 
distribution towards the high income families. On the other hand, when the 
upper limit is too low, the marginal interest rate is increased only for a few 
people, for those who save less than the limit. For the others, the subsidy is 
simply a transfer, and does not increase saving. Thus choosing too low limit 
might lead to an ineffective program. On the other hand, limits have an 
importance emphasized by Bernheim (2002). According to him, as agents have 
bounded ability to make optimal decisions, the contribution limit may define 
targets for saving. 
When the concern is the microeconomic point of view, i.e. that 
individuals undersave for their pension age because they lack self control, 
inciting non-financial saving can be reasonable. In practice, many forms of 
intervention are used, such as direct subsidy, tax incentive on saving for home 
purchase or on mortgage debt payments. National saving is negatively 
correlated with the loan value ratio of available mortgages (Honohan, 2000). 
Invigorating mortgage market for purchasing homes increases the living 
condition of families but increases the level of national saving only if individuals 
want to save more for the down-payment. 
To sum up, there are many possibilities for government intervention to 
stimulate household saving. It is not obvious, which is the best to use, or how to 
mix them. In addition, even if a government chose for instance to introduce tax 
incentives on long term saving, it could be done in many different forms. The 
extent and timing of the subsidy, the eligibility, the upper limit, penalties, or the 
form of saving which is subsidized all matter, and the outcome of the program 
could be sensitive to them. The way households make saving decisions is 
difficult, and competing theories explain it in different ways. How households 
respond to a saving incentive is even more complex, and different theories have 
different predictions already in the most simplified cases. Thus empirical 
analysis of the saving incentives is necessary. In the next sections I will 
concentrate on tax incentives on voluntary savings, and analyze their effect on 
household saving and on national saving. 
 14
3. Experience from other countries 
 
In other countries, especially in the United States, much research has been done 
about the crowding out effect of tax incentives on voluntary savings. Although 
not completely the same, the incentives in other countries are similar to the 
incentives in Hungary, and thus some inference can be drawn from this body of 
research with respect to Hungary as well. Importantly, too, earlier literature 
provides a wide variety of empirical methods which can be used to analyze 
household saving. In this section I review the empirical literature, highlighting 
both the methodologies dealing with the difficulty of identifying the effect of 
incentives and the main conclusions. 
 
3.1. Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution shows how much the consumption, 
and thus the saving, changes in response to a change in the interest rate. With 
regard to the effectiveness of saving incentives its value is crucial, because 
saving incentives actually influence the interest received on savings. If interest 
elasticity were negative then households would react to an increase of the 
interest rate by reducing savings, if it were around zero then it would have no 
effect on savings and if it were positive then higher interest rates would incite 
saving. Its value around unity would imply that that the ratio of consumption to 
the consumption in the previous period is proportional to the interest rate. 
A branch of empirical studies estimates interest elasticity of saving by 
simply regressing consumption or saving on the effective interest rate as one of 
the explanatory variables. Estimates are in a wide range, between 0 and 0.4 
(Bernheim, 2002). Two often cited papers on the extreme are Boskin (1978) and 
Hall (1988) (see also Feldstein, 1995). Boskin estimates the intertemporal 
elasticity of consumption to be around 0.5 which, according to him, is large 
enough to make room for policies raising the after tax rate of return on capital. 
Hall estimates the elasticity using many different datasets for the expected 
interest rate, and concludes that the elasticity is around zero and probably not 
above 0.2. 
One of the most important parameters deciding how effective the saving 
incentives can be is thus not only theoretically uncertain but also empirical 
results are mixed. The issue becomes even more difficult when the effect of a tax 
incentive is to be estimated. Tax incentives which subsidize long term voluntary 
savings change the effective interest rate (i.e. the interest rate what is perceived 
together with the subsidy) but usually not with a fixed primarily determined 
amount. The effective interest rate after taxes can be different for different assets 
and different people. Interest rate may not be fixed even for the same person 
and the same asset because there are limits above which the contribution does 
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not enjoy the tax allowance. Framing and timing effects change individuals’ 
decisions through channels explained by behavioral theories. Although 
elasticity of saving is an important parameter, a high elasticity would not assure 
that saving incentives are effective and incentives can be effective even if the 
elasticity is around zero. The complexity of saving incentives and the 
contradicting theories explaining how and why they would be beneficial make 
necessary to carry out research directly about these saving programs. 
 
3.2. Crowding out effect of tax deferred savings 
 
Next, I overview empirical research trying to estimate the extent to which 
contributions to tax-deferred saving accounts increase household saving or 
crowd out other types of household saving. The empirical literature is large in 
the United States and mostly consists of a still unresolved debate between 
economists who believe that tax incentives have a large positive effect on 
savings and those who believe that it has no or very small effect only. In this 
subsection I cover the literature on incentives in the US, and I devote a separate 
subsection to papers using data from other countries. 
In the United States there are two types of tax-deferred saving accounts 
introduced in the 70’s hoping to increase household savings: Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)s. Both are front loaded accounts with 
tax free accumulation. (For a detailed description of these plans see e.g. Engen et 
al., 1994.) Neither IRA nor 401(k) saving is available for the full population. 
IRA’s were first introduced for workers without pension coverage, then 
eligibility extended to all workers, and later eligibility was revoked from 
families with pension and income above a certain threshold. The eligibility for 
401(k) accounts is decided at the level of the employer. One way of identifying 
the effect of tax-deferred saving plans is to observe the effect of changes in IRA 
rules. Another way is to exploit the cross-sectional differences in 401(k) 
eligibility. Unfortunately, the variation in eligibility is not fully exogenous. In 
case of IRA it depends on whether the individual has pension coverage or later 
on income. In case of 401(k) the exogeneity, as it depends on where the 
individual is working, is more believable, but still can be correlated with 
unobserved saving characteristics. Contributions to both IRAs and 401(k)s are 
tax-deductible only below certain limit. This limit was also subject to changes 
several times, in addition the employer can also define additional limits for 
401(k) contributions as a percentage of the salary. The variation of limits are also 
often used by empirical studies, because these are presumably exogenous 
changes. 
In one way or another, all the empirical studies compare savings of those 
who have IRA or 401(k) account with those who do not have, or examine the 
correlation between tax-deferred and other savings. The difficulty arises from 
the fact that the variation in the amount saved on tax deferred accounts is not 
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exogenous. Families who have higher propensity to save, save more in IRAs and 
401(k) and also save more in other forms. Unfortunately the propensity of 
individuals to save cannot be observed. Not even panel data are helpful because 
the variation of the IRA contribution for the same person in time is either 
explained by observed variables (e.g. income) or is most likely to be due to a 
taste change which also affects other savings. The effort to identify which part of 
saving is due to individual differences and which part can be attributed to the 
tax incentives itself has led to a wide variety of techniques. In every case, the 
methodology is validated by at least one crucial assumption which is later 
debated by other authors. I shortly summarize the methodologies and results of 
a few interesting studies from both sides of this debate. For a more exhaustive 
review of this empirical literature see Bernheim (2002). 
One way to control for heterogeneity of tastes is to find measured 
variables which are expected to explain the variation in tastes. The most 
important variable is income, but it is usual to control for age, family size and 
other parameters as well. After removing at least a part of the individual taste 
effect by controlling for these variables, one can check if there is still some 
positive correlation between IRA or 401(k) savings and other savings. Poterba et 
al. (1995, p. 17–23) use this methodology. They control for age, income, 
education, marital status, the eligibility for 401(k), and whether the family has 
401(k) saving or IRA saving. Their results show that while IRA and 401(k) 
savings were growing through time, the other savings of families did not 
decrease, and they conclude that the increase of household savings between 
1984–1991 was almost entirely the effect of tax incentives. The crucial 
assumption in order to really overcome the endogeneity problem outlined 
above is that systematic heterogeneity of tastes is fully controlled by the 
variables chosen. 
The exogenous variation of eligibility is exploited for example by Engen 
et al. (1994, p. 127–128). They use panel data to follow changes in savings for the 
same household before and after eligibility was expanded to all workers. The 
methodology they use is known as difference-in-differences. They separate the 
sample to a target group, consisting of people who were not eligible before but 
became eligible after the change, and a control group of people eligible 
throughout. The difference of saving after and before the eligibility expansion is 
calculated for both groups, and compared to each other. Engen et al. (1994) 
found that the average growth of saving was significantly higher for the control 
group thus they concluded that the extension of IRA eligibility was not the real 
force increasing household saving at that time. The crucial assumption 
underlying this methodology is that the taste difference between the two sample 
groups is constant as pointed out by Bernheim (2002). Interestingly, Feenberg 
and Skinner (1989) using the same dataset and method, with the only difference 
that they investigated assets and not the saving rate, came to the opposite 
conclusion. They found that IRAs had increased saving. They calculated the 
change in interest income between 1980 and 1984 for all families, then compared 
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the change for those who contributed to IRAs and those who did not (also 
controlling for income). 
The effect of limit changes for IRA contributions is investigated by Engen 
et al. (1994, p. 128–133). They estimate the effect of changes in the IRA 
contribution-limit in a fixed effect setting, using panel data. Their dependent 
variable is, in contrast to the above studies, the yearly saving, i.e. the change in 
assets. Their OLS estimate of the IRA limit coefficient is insignificant, but the 
estimate from the median regression is positive. They conclude that for an 
average contributor each dollar contributed increases his or her gross saving by 
0.31 dollar. Taking into account the tax revenue loss they find that only 4 % of 
IRA contributions increase national saving. 
The 401(k) eligibility difference across employers is exploited in Poterba 
et al. (1995, p.  14-17). They compare different savings in different income 
groups for eligible and non-eligible households. They find that while the non-
401(k) assets are almost equal for eligibles and non-eligibles, the total assets, 
including 401(k) savings, are higher for eligible households at any income. Thus 
they conclude that 401(k)s increase household saving. 
We see from the above short summary of important empirical surveys 
that the conclusions regarding the usefulness of these plans are contradictory. 
As Engelhardt (1996) points out, these contradictory results are often calculated 
from the same data. One group of authors always gets to the conclusion that the 
tax incentives increase saving, whatever data and method they are using, while 
others always conclude the opposite. As Hubbard and Skinner (1996) suggest 
the truth is likely to lie between the two extremes: saving incentives increase 
saving but with a smaller amount than subsequently predicted by Poterba et al. 
(1995, 1996) and Venti and Wise (1996). Hubbard and Skinner believe that one 
dollar contributed to IRAs represent about 26 cents new saving, which is a 
compromise between 0 and 56 cents. 
 
3.3. Saving incentives outside the United States 
 
Although tax deferred saving plans are available in most developed countries 
there are relatively few empirical papers assessing the effectiveness of saving 
incentives in other countries than the United States. 
One interesting example is Germany where saving remains relatively 
high even for old people, despite the high replacement rates4 in the public 
pension system. Whole life insurance, which is an asset with both an investment 
component and insurance component, constitutes a large part of household 
saving in Germany. Walliser and Winter (1998) conclude by analyzing data from 
the German Consumer Expenditure Survey (EVS) that the demand for whole 
life insurance is partly due to the tax exempt of this type of saving. 
                                                 
4The replacement rate for public pensions is about 70% in Germany. 
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Japelli and Pistaferri (2003) examine the effect of change in the tax 
treatment of life insurance contributions in Italy. They conclude that the change 
of tax incentives did not even have an effect on portfolio choice, which means 
that the incentive had no effect at all. They show that households to whom the 
after tax interest rate for life insurance investment increased did not save more 
in life insurance compared to households to whom the after tax interest rate 
decreased. 
In the United Kingdom accumulated interest on special saving accounts 
is tax exempt. These savings do not need to be accumulated for retirement and 
are more liquid than incited savings in other countries since withdrawal is only 
penalized in the first 5 years of accumulation. Attanasio et al. (2004) analyze 
data on these accounts and find that only small part of the tax deferred savings 
represent new saving, i.e. there is a strong crowding out effect. 
Similarly to the methodology of Engen et al. (1994, p. 127–128) and 
Feenberg and Skinner (1989), Engelhardt (1996) uses the cancellation of Home 
Ownership Saving Plan in Canada, which is an exogenous variation in 
eligibility. He concludes that the plan had substantial impact on national saving 
in Canada. 
In Canada there is a pension saving program as well, called RRSP, with 
outstandingly high contribution limits compared to other countries and 
unrestricted availability. Sabelhaus (1997) examines the effect of RRSP savings 
on Canadian national saving. He argues that although aggregate figures would 
suggest that household saving is higher in Canada than in the US because 
RRSPs are better than IRAs or 401(k)s, more detailed analysis shows that the 
differences in the saving plans are not the main reason for the differences in 
savings. 
In most countries there is some tax subsidy inciting household saving. It 
is impossible to judge them on theoretical grounds only. Empirical results 
provide a better understanding of their impact, but their results are 
contradictory. The bulk of the empirical studies discussing the effectiveness of 
saving incentives, i.e. the extent of crowding out effect, analyzes data from the 
US. Recently a few studies were carried out in some European countries (also 
with mixed results) but no empirical research has been done in Hungary. 
The unresolved debate in the empirical literature shows that there was no 
real success in handling the endogeneity of tax deferred savings. The most 
promising methods may be those which use panel data and a historical change 
in eligibility. 
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4. Tax incentives in Hungary 
 
Before presenting my empirical results on Hungarian household saving, it is 
necessary to review the Hungarian tax incentives on pension saving5. There are 
two subsidized forms of pension saving: voluntary supplementary pension 
funds and long term pension insurance. In this section I will summarize their 
features. I will also provide evidence on the low number of people contributing 
at the upper limit, suggesting that a large part of contributions may represent 
new saving. 
Voluntary supplementary pension funds constitute a pillar of the 
Hungarian pension system. The benefits received from the fund after 3 years of 
accumulation and at retirement are tax exempt. Withdrawal before retirement 
but after more than 10 years membership or before 3 years membership but after 
retirement is possible, but in that case personal income tax has to be payed on 
the principal (but not on accumulated interest). Obviously, an important 
element of the incentive is that assets held in supplementary pension funds are 
illiquid. Before retirement or 10 years of membership money cannot be 
withdrawn at all from the account. As I explained in Section 2, illiquidity in 
itself can increase the level of savings. 
Part of the contributions can be subtracted from personal income tax. 
When voluntary pension funds were introduced in 1994, the whole contribution 
was to be deducted from the taxable income. From 1995 50% of contributions 
could be deducted from the tax itself, which is a higher subsidy since income tax 
in the highest bracket was 44 percent in 1994. In 2000 the subsidy was decreased: 
since then only 30 percent of contributions is subtractable from income tax. This 
approximately means that both the interest and the principal are tax-free6. In the 
US, the benefit from joining a 401(k) plan arises only from tax-free accumulation 
of interest. In Hungary, however, interest income is usually not taxed so the 
incentive had to decrease the tax on the principal. 
In Hungary the after-tax balance in period T per forint of pretax income 
in a conventional saving account is  
B1=(1-t)(1+r)
T  
where τ is the tax rate and r is the interest rate. The same balance in a voluntary 
supplementary pension fund is  
B2=(1-t+0.3)(1+r)
T  
The after-penalty balance in case of early withdrawal is  
 B3=(1-t+0.3)(1+r)
T-t  
                                                 
5There were other types of savings incited by tax allowances in Hungary: home ownership 
saving and stock investment. However, these incentives have been canceled. 
6The progressive income tax is 18% in the low and 38% in the high bracket. The average tax is 
equal to 30% for people with 312500 forints monthly gross income. 
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B3 is higher than B1 for reasonable values of τ. If for example the average tax is 
equal to 30% then B3 corresponds to a tax credit where the tax can be payed 
only at the time of withdrawal and thus the interest is accumulated on the 
untaxed principal. When a person who is only a few years before retirement 
enters a voluntary pension fund he will probably withdraw before 10 years of 
accumulation and thus get only the lower subsidy, corresponding to B3 (instead 
of B2), but in exchange his or her fund saving is more liquid. 
The Hungarian system differs from most of the OECD countries (New 
Zealand is the other exemption) in that benefits from the private pensions are 
not subject to income tax. (Neither are the public pension benefits.) As noted 
earlier, when people make saving decisions they might consider gains in the far 
future with less weight because of hyperbolic discounting. So, deferring taxes 
when the benefits are received is less inciting than the same amount deferred at 
the time of contribution. 
At the outset, in 1994, the limit subtraction from taxable income was 
500,000 forints or 25% of the taxable income. The limit of subtraction was 
decreased in 1995 to 100,000 forints deductible from the income tax and 
increased in 1998 to 130,000 forints for those who reach retirement age before 
2020. There was an indirect limit increase in 2000 when the subtractable 
percentage of contributions was changed from 50% to 30%. As a result, higher 
contribution corresponded to the limit subtraction: 333,333 instead of 200,000 
forints for those who do not retire before 2020 and 433,333 instead of 260,000 for 
those who do.  
As pointed out for example by Bernheim (2002) the upper limit of 
contributions should be chosen carefully, mainly because the marginal rate of 
return is not increased on savings for those who contribute at the limit. They 
instead perceive the tax incentive as a transfer, and do not change their behavior 
(according to the life cycle theory). In addition, limit contributors probably have 
other savings, thus the early withdrawal penalty does not deter them from 
decreasing their saving later. As a result, their contribution probably increases 
their total saving neither in the short run nor in the long run. The number of 
people contributing at the limit already suggests something about the possible 
extent of the crowding out effect. 
In 2003, according to a representative sample from the Hungarian Tax Authority 
(APEH) only 3% of contributors contributed the maximum amount (100,000 or 
130,000 forints). This share is extremely low compared to the 70% value in the 
US (Bernheim, 2002, p. 1213.). The limit contributions total up to 15.6 percent of 
all contributions. This suggests that 15.6% of the contributions would have been 
saved anyway. The other 84.4% can be partly new saving. 
   
Figure 3:  Number of limit contributors in the percentage of pension fund members and 
the share coming from limit contributors 
% of limit % of their saving 
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contributors  
             
 
 
Figure 3 graphs how the number of limit contributors changed through 
time. Apparently a higher percentage of voluntary pension fund members 
contributed the maximum amount before 2000. The large drop in 2000 was due 
to the indirect limit increase, so the tax rule change made the tax incentive 
probably more effective in the sense that a larger part of contributions might 
represent real increase in savings since then.  
Employers may match contributions up to a limit of the all-time 
minimum income. The matched contributions can be accounted as cost for the 
employer and are not included in the taxable income of the employee. After the 
tax rule change in 2000, employer contributions became more favorable than 
individual contributions (except for individuals in the lowest tax bracket). As a 
result, individual contributions dropped in 2000. The average individual 
contributions are shown in Figure 4. Since there was no parallel drop in the 
aggregate increase of voluntary pension fund wealth in 2000, it had to be offset 
by a similar increase in employer contributions. 
  
Figure 4:  Average yearly individual payments to voluntary supplementary pension 
funds (in thousand Ft) 
 
 
In addition to the voluntary supplementary pension funds, pension 
insurance is subsidized as well if its maturity is at least 10 years. Twenty percent 
of payments but maximum 50,000 forints per year can be deducted from the 
% of saving by 
limit contributors 
% of limit 
contributors 
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personal income tax. This allowance was also subject to changes.: until 1992 the 
limit was much lower, only 7200 forints, and there was one year, 1993, when this 
tax allowance was not available.  
It would be useful to know the volume of aggregate savings in this form 
and the share coming from limit contributors, like for voluntary supplementary 
funds. Unfortunately, I had no access to data about pension insurances. 
This section showed that tax incited voluntary pension saving increases 
the marginal return on saving for the majority of people because only a few of 
them are contributing at the limit. Thus it might increase savings if it does not 
crowd out non-deferred savings. The next section presents my empirical results 
suggesting that the crowding-out effect is probably not significant, and large 
part of the tax deferred saving represents new saving. 
 
5. Evidence from the Hungarian Household Survey 
 
Although important inferences can be drawn from the large body of research 
summarized in Section 3, I believe that analysis of data on saving of Hungarian 
households is important. Even if the previous literature had an equivocal 
answer to the question whether tax deferred saving crowds out other types 
saving, it is based on data from other countries, mostly from the United States. 
There might be significant differences in how US and Eastern European 
households respond to the tax incentives. Culture and history might play a 
significant role in determining the saving behavior of families, Hungarian 
households may react differently from US households and may have different 
taste for saving. As we have seen, the saving incentives introduced in Hungary 
are somewhat different from their US counterparts, IRAs and 401(k)s, even 
though they share many similar elements. In addition, the whole tax system 
differs across countries as well. 
In this section I address the primary question of my work: Do tax 
deferred voluntary pension savings represent new saving or they crowd out 
other types of personal savings as households shift to the more advantageous 
forms of saving?  I present evidence on the effects of saving incentives in 
Hungary based on data from the Household Monitor a survey conducted by 
Tárki (Hungarian Social Research Institute). The Household Monitor is a 
nationally representative household survey, completed yearly. The data base 
includes total savings of the households and monthly contributions to tax-
deferred saving plans (supplementary voluntary pension funds and long term 
pension insurance). Unfortunately it does not include data about assets in these 
funds and insurances so the assets had to be estimated.  
The Household Monitor data has some other drawbacks. First, as it is 
cross sectional data the conclusions drawn from it are less reliable than what 
could be extracted from a panel data set. Second, a more serious problem is that 
it only covers a part of household savings. Tárki compares the aggregate savings 
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of household sector and savings in Household Monitor data and gets to the 
conclusion that the survey covers only 27% of the actual savings (in 2001). 
Unfortunately, there was no exploitable exogenous change in the tax 
rules during the time period the data cover. The change in 1998 in the upper 
limit for those who retire before 2020 would be a good exogenous variation for 
our purpose since although it depends on age the only systematic difference 
between those retiring in 2020 and those retiring in 2021 is probably the 
difference in the contribution limit. However, as the data do not cover all 
contributions to pension funds, there are too few people sown by the data to 
exploit this additional allowed contribution, i.e. the opportunity to contribute 
more than the limit being in effect for those who retire only after 2020. 
I will use data of 1998, which is the first year when the survey included 
data about tax deferred saving and also the date of entering to a pension fund or 
signing a pension insurance contract, and of 2001, which is the last available 
year of the survey. 
The financial saving of households needs to be analyzed when we are 
interested in the financing capacity of the household sector. However, when the 
concern is about households welfare we should rather focus on financial and 
nonfinancial assets together. In this section I will always consider the following 
5 asset types:  
A1 Assets accumulated in voluntary supplementary pension fund and in 
insurance (maturity of more than 10 years). I often refer to this category as tax 
deferred savings. Assets are estimated from the current monthly payments and 
the date when the respondent first contributed. There are some uncertainties 
causing the estimated values to be imprecise and possibly biased, too. First, 
monthly payments were probably not constant in most of the cases since the 
first time of contribution but we do not know how they have changed. Second, 
as there were huge differences in yields across funds it would be very difficult 
to incorporate the accumulated interest in the assets. Finally, using the self 
declared monthly contributions for estimating the assets is possibly downward 
biased because end-of-tax-year contributions are allowed as well in these funds 
and survey respondents might take only regular payments into account. I made 
the simplifying assumption that the rate of increase of contributions equals the 
yield rate, and estimated the accumulated assets as current monthly 
contribution multiplied by the number of months passed since the first time of 
contribution7 .  
A2 Other financial assets, as estimated by the respondents themselves to the 
question: If you add up all the money, bank deposits, stocks, shares and foreign 
currency that you saved up, approximately how many HUF would it make?   
A3 Total financial assets, that is the sum of tax deferred and other financial 
assets.  
                                                 
7Average yield and change of average contribution could have been estimated and taken into 
account but I believe that this correction would not change the main implications drawn from 
the reasults. 
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A4 Net financial assets, computed as total financial assets minus liabilities. 
Liabilities are also the amounts reported by the respondents.  
A5 Total assets, computed as net financial assets plus home equity. It may be 
more reasonable to use this category instead of net financial assets because 
liabilities include home mortgages as well. However, its drawback is that home 
equity only includes the value of the house or flat in which the family is living. 
Engen et al. (1994) also suggest focusing on total assets instead of financial 
assets. They criticize other authors to overestimate the effects of saving 
incentives partly because they only deal with financial assets. They argue that 
financial assets grew only because people shifted from housing to tax-favored 
financial saving in the form of owning less housing equity and also in the form 
of buying homes for higher proportion mortgage and lower down payment8 .  
Not looking at all of these asset types could be misleading. There might 
be a large shift between housing and financial assets because the relative return 
changes; or gross savings might increase while net savings decrease because 
financial markets are liberalizing and households can more easily take bank 
loans. By only looking at one type these effects could not be separated from the 
effect of saving incentives. 
 
5.1. Cross-sectional analysis 
 
Measuring the effect of voluntary pension fund membership and pension 
insurance on savings is difficult because the choice of entering a pension fund or 
buying pension insurance is not exogenous. Typically, those who take 
advantage of these saving incentives have originally a higher taste for saving 
than others. 
To overcome this endogeneity problem, I used the difference-in-
differences method suggested by Poterba et al. (1995). They divide the sample 
into four groups of families who are likely to have similar individual saving-
characteristic. They use dummies as grouping variables indicating whether the 
family has savings on tax deferred accounts. Their first dummy stands for IRA 
saving, the second for 401(k) saving. They assume that within one group the 
average saving characteristic is constant through time thus the change in the 
mean savings can be compared across groups. They compare for example those 
with both tax deferred accounts and those with IRA but without 401(k), thus 
using the IRA dummy as a control variable when assessing the effect of 401(k)’s.  
In Hungary the two types of tax deferred pension saving (voluntary 
supplementary pension fund and long term pension insurance) cannot be used 
similarly to establish four groups because there is almost no household in the 
                                                 
8This issue is less of a problem in Hungary because almost all families own their homes and 
because a higher down payment is usually needed for mortgages compared to the US. In 
addition, home equity is less liquid in Hungary. 
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sample possessing both types of account9. Thus I divided the sample into only 
two subsamples: families who contribute to tax deferred pension funds and 
families who do not. The first is treated as target group and the second as 
control group. I calculated the mean assets of both groups for all types of assets 
listed above (tax deferred saving, other financial saving, total financial saving, 
net financial saving, total saving including home asset) in two years, 1998 and 
2001. I then compared the change of means between 1998 and 2001 for the target 
and the control group. As Poterba et al. (1995) suggest if savings of the target 
group increased less (or decreased more) than the savings of the control group, 
then tax deferred savings are likely to be financed from other types of savings. 
On the other hand, if all types of savings of the target group increased more (or 
decreased less) than the savings of the control group then the saving in tax 
deferred pension funds is likely to represent new saving. 
Part of the variation in savings between the two observation years might 
be due to variation in household income and other family characteristics. In 
order to separate this effect, I controlled for income per person, education, and 
gender the following way. For the five types of assets and for both groups I 
estimated separately the regression  
Ati = α + βXti  + γYear01 + εti 
where X is the vector of controlled variables and Year01 is a year dummy (0 in 
1998, 1 in 2001) allowing different intersections for the two observation years. 
Note that β is assumed to be constant through time. I first included the age of 
the household head as a control variable, too, but its effect was insignificant for 
every type of asset at any reasonable level10. For the same reason I only included 
a college dummy for education. Then I estimated mean assets in both year at the 
1998 mean values of the control variables:  
 
The mean assets, controlled for income per person, gender and college 
degree of household head are presented in Table 1. Values in both year are CPI 
adjusted to 1995.  
Table 1:  Mean assets of households with and without tax deferred savings 
 1998 2001 difference diff-in-diffs 
Tax deferred assets of households 
with tax deferred savings  
 
43 141 
 
77 102 
 
33 962 
 
 
                                                 
9In 1998 out of the 168 families in the sample who had some tax deferred pension saving only 6 
had both types. 
10That the age is insignificant in estimating savings contradicts the life cycle theory, which 
predicts that savings increase in the first part of the life-cycle and decrease after retirement. This 
puzzle will reappear in Section 5.2.2 where I examine savings of cohorts. 
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without tax deferred savings 0 0 0 33 962 
Other financial assets of households 
with tax deferred savings  
without tax deferred savings 
 
160 350 
13 281 
 
228 385 
70 127 
 
68 035 
56 846 
 
 
11 189 
Total financial assets of households 
with tax deferred savings  
without tax deferred savings 
 
83 414 
13 281 
 
185 062 
70 127 
 
101 648 
56 846 
 
 
44 802 
Net financial assets of households with tax 
deferred savings  
without tax deferred savings 
 
32 034 
- 20 107 
 
124 720 
40 481 
 
92 685 
60588 
 
 
32 097 
Total assets of households  
with tax deferred savings  
without tax deferred savings 
 
1 658 542 
1 282 254 
 
2 321 874 
1 774 011 
 
663 332 
491 757 
 
 
171 575 
  
It is worth noting that the same difference-in differences estimates 
(shown in the last column of the table) could have been attained as the 
parameter g1 estimated from the regression  
Ati = α0 + γ0Year01 + α1Dvoluntary + γ1  Year01 Dvoluntary + β0Xti  + β1Dvoluntary Xti + εti 
 
where Dvoluntary is a dummy variable standing for whether the household has 
tax deferred voluntary pension saving11. 
Table 1 shows that whatever type of saving is considered, savings of 
average households increased between 1998 and 2001. In addition, for every 
type of savings households with voluntary pension fund membership or long 
term pension insurance increased their savings more than households who did 
not take advantage of any of these tax incentives (all the values in the last 
column of Table 1 are positive). These results suggest that the policy targeted 
savings do not crowd out other types of savings. Instead, they represent new 
saving, families decrease their consumption to make use of the tax incentives. 
Indeed, the difference in net financial assets seems to be entirely due to the tax 
deferred pension savings. 
The analysis of Poterba et al. (1995) I followed above was criticized by 
Engen et al. (1996). Their main critique is that Poterba et al. considered financial 
assets only, while households contributing to 401(k) plans might have 
                                                 
11To see that the two methods yield the same difference-in-differences estimates we have to peg 
that for the target group a=a0+a1, b=b0+b1, and g=g0+g1; and for the control group a=a0, b=b0, 
and g=g0. It follows that the mean assets for the two groups are A¯1998= α
^0+ α^1 +β^0X¯1998 + 
β^1X¯1998, A¯2001= α^0+ α^1 +β^0X¯1998 + β^1X¯1998 +γ^0+γ^1 and A¯1998= α^0 +β^0X¯1998, A¯2001= α^0+ 
β^0X¯1998 +γ^0., respectively. The differences are γ^0+γ^1  and γ^0, thus the difference-in-
differences estimate is equal to γ^1. 
 27
reallocated wealth from nonfinancial to financial assets. Indeed, Engen et al. 
show that US households with 401(k) did not accumulate more wealth when 
housing equity was included. We see from the results in Table 1 that in Hungary 
the conclusion from total assets including home equity is the same as with 
financial assets only. Thus the above critique is not valid here. However, it is 
possible that voluntary pension fund members redistributed wealth from 
housing assets to financial assets and still their home assets increased more than 
for the control group. The target group had more home assets in 1998 than the 
control group and since real home prices approximately doubled during the 
period their home asset would have increased more by default. 
Although as Table 1 shows the difference-in differences estimator is 
positive for all types of assets, it is not necessarily correct to conclude that it is 
because tax incentives increased saving. The similar result of Poterba et al. 
(1995) are more persuasive because savings there did not increase for 
households with tax deferred accounts but increased for households without it. 
Here in contrary, both increased, and the fact that the savings of the target 
group increased more might simply sign that there is a systematic difference 
between the two groups in the increase of savings as well. This problem would 
not disappear even if we had panel data and could use a fixed effect model to 
control for individual differences. However, if saving rates were also available 
to use instead of assets then a panel analysis similar to the one conducted by 
Engen et al. (1994) would perhaps lead to more reliable conclusions. Next, 
instead, I use a different approach called cohort analysis to answer the same 
question: whether tax incited saving crowds out other personal saving. 
 
5.2. Comparison of cohorts 
 
5.2.1. Two cohorts before retirement 
 
Following Poterba et al. (1996) I compared the assets of two cohorts just before 
retirement. The idea underlying the methodology is that we can assume that the 
two cohorts have the same characteristics except from the difference in the 
length of time they were exposed to saving incentives. People born in the same 
year form one cohort12. We will observe two cohorts reaching the same age, 54 
years, in different years. Both observed cohorts fully represent the before-
pension population at their time, so they are likely to have the same 
unobservable human characteristics on average. However, the younger cohort 
had a longer time to accumulate tax reduced accounts because they were 
younger at the time when the allowance was introduced. If their savings turn 
out to be higher it is probably due to the longer exposure to the incited saving 
                                                 
12In practice I formed one cohort from people born in 3 (this section) or 5 (next section) 
subsequent years to increase sample size. 
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possibilities. This way of dealing with heterogeneity makes it possible to assume 
that the length of contribution to pension funds is exogenous. 
Venti and Wise (1996) analyzed assets of households just before and after 
retirement. Since I estimated the tax deferred savings from monthly 
contributions, and households after retirement typically do not have any 
payments to the pension fund or insurance company, I could only investigate 
families before retirement.  
Tax rules aiming to stimulate pension fund membership were first 
introduced in 1994. I compare the savings of two cohorts at the age of 5413. The 
older cohort reached this age in 1998, the younger in 2001. Thus the first group 
had 4 years to accumulate on the tax deferred account while the second group 
had 7 years. I again control for income the same way as in the previous section 
but dismiss the less important control variables because the sample size is too 
small14 and the degree of freedom would have been too low otherwise. The 
mean savings of the two cohorts at age 54 are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2:  Mean savings at age 54 of cohorts born in 1944 and 1947 (forint) 
 old cohortyoung cohort
A1 Pension funds and insurance assets 17,778 18,247
A2 Other financial assets 101,050 122,841
A3 Total financial assets 122,679 151,616
A4 Net financial assets 81,307 72,343
A5 Total assets 2,928,801 6,959,854
  
The tax deferred savings are only slightly larger for the younger cohort 
(reaching age 54 in 2001). We should remember that pension fund assets were 
estimated from the entry year and from the monthly contributions. Thus if the 
monthly contributions were constant through time then the estimated assets of 
the young cohort would be about 7/4 time of the estimated assets of the old 
cohort. If the estimated assets of the younger cohort are less than 7/4 times of 
the assets of the older cohort then the average amount of monthly contributions 
had to decrease after 1998 thus the estimation of the assets of the younger cohort 
is downward biased. 
To see whether there is a crowding out effect we are interested in the 
other asset types, A2–A5. Most of the other asset types are also larger for the 
younger cohort suggesting that tax incentives generate new saving and do not 
crowd out other saving. However, mean net financial assets (A4) are smaller for 
the younger cohort, which can sign that the increased asset holding is financed 
from debt, not from decreasing consumption. 
A large share of the population had neither bank account nor debt or 
saving (30–40% of families). These mostly low income households had never 
had any connection to financial institutions. When we are interested in the 
                                                 
13The age of the household is defined as that of the household head. 
14In one cohort there are only about 20 households with tax deferred savings 
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changes of savings it is reasonable to restrict the analysis on “financially 
relevant” households who have positive financial saving or debt, as suggested 
by Tóth and Árvai (2001)15. As Table 3 shows, after leaving out non-relevant 
households from the sample all asset types are higher for the younger cohort 
(even net financial assets). This suggests that tax deferred saving does not crowd 
out other saving but represents new saving. 
Table 3:  Mean savings of relevant households at age 54 (forint) 
 old cohortyoung cohort
A1 Pension funds and insurance assets 38,270 47,832
A2 Other financial assets 189,220 286,894
A3 Total financial assets 229,089 341,240
A4 Net financial assets 148,848 192,432
A5 Total assets 3,283,986 7,315,007
  
The most striking fact appearing from both Table 2 and Table 3 is the low 
level of saving in families just a few years before retirement. According to the 
life-cycle model the observed age would be the age when individuals posses the 
highest assets but in fact the average financial saving of the families is only 
about one-third of the average yearly income. 
Housing assets are much higher than financial assets probably because 
most families in Hungary live in their own flat for historical reasons. In 
addition, real estate investment has a high prestige among households since 
people consider it to be a less risky long term investment than securities. Thus 
they prefer to invest in real estate than in other instruments. 
   
                                                 
15The same restriction is used by Engen et al. (1994). 
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Figure 5:  House prices 
 
             CPI          real prices 
 
 
Although both Table 2 and Table 3 confirm the result from the previous 
section, i.e. that the incentives increase household saving, the average financial 
asset holding of families before retirement is still extremely low and increase 
only slowly. A significant increase between 1998 and 2001 can only be observed 
if we take into account home equity but this increase can mainly be attributed to 
the high increase in real house prices between 1998 and 2001 (see Figure 5). 
 
5.2.2. Following cohorts in time 
 
When the data consist of independent representative samples in different points 
of time, following families through time like in panel data is not possible. 
Instead, as suggested by Venti and Wise (1996), I define a whole series of 
cohorts, calculate the mean assets within all cohorts16 and follow the means 
through time. Then it is possible to compare the assets of the same cohort in 
different years, the assets of different cohorts at the same age, or the assets of 
different cohorts in the same year. 
I will refer to a cohort with the age it reached in 1995. C30, for instance, 
denotes those who were 30 years old in 1995. I calculated the mean assets of 7 
cohorts (C27, C32, C37, C42, C47, C52 and C57) for the 5 asset types in three 
years, 1995, in 1998, and in 2001. 
 
                                                 
16It is suggested by many authors to use median instead of means as a measure because it is 
more robust: it is e.g. less sensitive to high positive outliers. However, in Hungary less than half 
of the families have positive assets and medians would be all zero (except for the last type, A5) 
thus it would not be informative. 
Home prices 
Consumer 
prices 
Real home 
prices 
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Figure 6:  Saving of cohorts (thousand Ft in (a)-(d), million Ft in (e)) 
 
 
(a) A1 Pension funds and pension insurances (b) A2  Other financial assets 
 
 
(c) A3 Total financial assets (d) A4 Net financial assets 
 
  
(e) A5 Total assets (including home equity) 
 
Figure 6(a) shows the results for type A1, the tax favored pension 
savings. Any three connected points show the pension asset of one particular 
cohort in the three years of observation. These lines should be increasing for all 
cohorts because only contributions were taken into account for the estimation of 
the assets and not the withdrawals. Yet, the path bounds back for the C52 cohort 
and almost for the C57 cohort as well. The reason is that the assets of the older 
people are imprecisely estimated. In particular, they are underestimated, 
because a large part of these cohorts was already retired, and since retired 
people did not contribute to pension funds anymore their assets are estimated to 
be zero even though they might be positive. 
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The prevailing pattern from Figures 6(b) and 6(c) is that in most cohorts 
the level of both other and total financial saving dropped between 1995 and 
1998, then increased between 1998 and 2001 but reached the 1995 level only in 
the older cohorts, C52 and C57. The decrease of savings after 1995 is at least 
partly due to the sharp decrease of real wages in 1995 and 1996. Although real 
wages already increased in 1997, they reached their 1994 level only in 200117. It 
is possible that the 1995-96 shock is the reason for the saving level in 1998 being 
still much below the 1995 level. The extent to which the drop in total financial 
saving is to be interpreted as evidence against the beneficial effect of tax favored 
saving program is uncertain. The promising catch up by 2001 supports what we 
found in the previous sections: in the long run, voluntary supplementary fund 
saving does not substitute other financial savings but constitutes new stocks 
(even though only a small stock) of saving which would not exist without the 
tax incentives. 
Total net savings (A4) showed on Figure 6(d) increased in every cohort 
since tax incentives have been introduced, and a small fraction of this increase is 
coming from voluntary pension fund savings. 
Including housing, the assets are much higher again. One possible 
explanation was provided in the previous section. Mean values of housing 
assets move approximately in line with the real housing prices in this period, 
(see Figure 5). 
Usual cross sectional comparison of different cohorts in the same year 
could be done by looking e.g. at the third point of each line. The life-cycle 
hypothesis predicts that until retirement savings increase. Accordingly, if the 
motivation for saving is the one explained by the life-cycle theory, these points 
should show an increasing pattern18. This pattern does not emerge from my 
results on A1 assets showed on Figure 6. Comparing the paths we see that the 
middle aged families (C32 and C37) accumulated the most, and families just 
before retirement have much lower savings than younger families. The reason 
might be again that the older a cohort is, the higher the share of those who are 
already retired, and thus the more the estimated A1 assets are biased 
downward. 
Looking at other types of savings, A3–A5, the contradiction to the life-
cycle model seems to disappear but still no strong support can be observed. 
Public pensions were not included in the assets although they are in fact 
mandated savings. I believe that if the present value of receipts from the social 
security system were taken into account as an asset, the wealth of families 
would increase until retirement and decrease after, in line with the life-cycle 
model. 
Along vertical dashed lines we can compare the assets of different 
cohorts at the same age. This vertical difference corresponds to the actual effect 
                                                 
17Source: HCSO (KSH) 
18The last point corresponding to age 63 may already be lower because a large share of 63 years 
old are already retired. 
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of the tax policy on voluntary pension fund savings. For example, until the age 
of 33 the C27 cohort accumulated in voluntary pension funds about seven 
thousand forints more than the C32 cohort (Figure 6(a)), but about fifty 
thousand forints less in other forms (Figure 6(b)). 
Obviously, for A1 assets, the younger cohorts’ savings always exceed the 
elders’ at the same age as they had had already more years since the start of the 
pension funds when they reached the same age. If their savings in other types 
are lower then tax deferred savings probably crowd out other savings. In 
contrast, if other savings are higher as well, then it suggests that the A1 assets 
represent new savings. Looking at Figure 6, only A4 assets confirm the results of 
the previous sections: namely that tax deferred saving increases household 
saving. Even in case of A4 assets, for instance at age 33 the C27 cohort had about 
one hundred thousand forints higher net financial savings than the C32 cohort, 
while only about seven thousand forints more voluntary pension savings. The 
whole increase in the net financial assets cannot be due to the tax incentives on 
pension saving, and this makes the conclusions about new savings less 
plausible. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Household saving was low in the last decade in Hungary, similarly to most 
European countries, the United States and Canada. Low household saving gives 
rise to concerns about the drop in living standard after retirement. In addition, 
household saving is the most important component of national saving, thus if it 
is low then economic growth can slow down. 
I analyzed the effect of saving incentives on household saving and 
national saving, focusing on the tax incentives on voluntary pension savings. In 
Hungary voluntary supplementary pension fund contributions and long term 
pension insurance savings are tax exempt. Although aggregate figures show 
that savings in these forms are relatively low in Hungary compared to similar 
programs in other countries, they are steadily increasing. The latter suggests 
that tax deferred saving will form an important fraction of household saving 
within a few years. 
Since the aim of these saving incentives is in part to increase national 
saving, it is important to know whether their increase is only due to 
redistribution from other types of saving or to reduced consumption. In order to 
find out this I investigated Hungarian household data. Using the difference in 
differences methodology, I found supporting evidence for the view that tax 
deferred savings do not crowd out other types of saving thus they increase 
national saving. However, a cohort analysis on the same data provided mixed 
results. 
The scope of these results is limited because, as earlier empirical research 
in other countries showed, conclusions are very sensitive to the methodology 
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used. Both methodologies I applied are based on assumptions which are not 
necessarily true. More reliable conclusions could be drawn from panel data, 
such as tax authority data, exploiting the variation in the limit of contributions 
for those who retire before 2020.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be more evidence favoring the new-saving 
view. On the whole, my empirical results suggest that the crowding out effect is 
not strong thus the tax incentives in Hungary are effective. 
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